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Abstract
We analyze multiline pricing and capital allocation in equilibrium no-arbitrage
markets. Existing theories often assume a perfect complete market, but when pricing
is linear, there is no diversification benefit from risk pooling and therefore no role for
insurance companies. Instead of a perfect market, we assume a non-additive distortion
pricing functional and the principle of equal priority of payments in default. Under
these assumptions, we derive a canonical allocation of premium and margin, with
properties that merit the name the natural allocation. The natural allocation gives
non-negative margins to all independent lines for default-free insurance but can exhibit
negative margins for low-risk lines under limited liability. We introduce novel conditional
expectation measures of relative risk within a portfolio and use them to derive simple,
intuitively appealing expressions for risk margins and capital allocations. We give a
unique capital allocation consistent with our law invariant pricing functional. Such
allocations produce returns that vary by line, in contrast to many other approaches.
Our model provides a bridge between the theoretical perspective that there should be
no compensation for bearing diversifiable risk and the empirical observation that more
risky lines fetch higher margins relative to subjective expected values.
JEL Codes: G22, G10
1 Introduction
The complete perfect market paradigm dominates financial models of insurance pricing
developed since the 1970s. These models imply the existence of an additive valuation
rule, meaning there is no benefit from diversification and no role for insurer intermediaries.
Moreover, they typically provide no compensation for bearing diversifiable risk. Milestones in
this approach include the use of discounted cash flows, Myers and Cohn (1987) and Cummins
(1990), and options pricing Doherty and Garven (1986) and Cummins (1988). Phillips,
Cummins, and Allen (1998) and Myers and Read Jr. (2001) considered multiple line pricing,
allowing for ex ante default rules, which Sherris (2006) and Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden
(2010) extended to ex post rules. From Phillips’s contribution forward, there is a focus on
what happens in default states to explain premiums by line. Aside from non-diversifiable risk
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and tail-driven default, these models do not reflect the overall distribution of losses, or what
we will call the shape of risk.
Holding capital in an intermediary insurance company introduces frictional costs, which
Cummins (2000) explains are primarily driven by agency conflict, taxes, and regulation. Why
would insureds incur the extra expense of buying through an insurer in a perfect market?
Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2010) assume insureds do not have direct access to ultimate
capital providers or that there are additional costs to do so. This somewhat unsatisfactory
explanation was anticipated by Grundl and Schmeiser (2007), who pointed out that pricing
does not depend on allocation in a perfect market. Bauer and Zanjani (2013) consider capital
allocation in the context of allocating frictional costs.
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing states that in a perfect market the existence of
an additive valuation rule is essentially equivalent to no arbitrage, Ross (1978), Dybvig and
Ross (1989), Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994). The thought that insurance valuation rules
must be additive has exerted a considerable influence on theory and practice, Borch (1982),
Venter (1991). But while indubitably competitive, the insurance market is neither perfect
nor complete.
Imperfect or incomplete pricing paradigms isolate different failures of the perfect complete
model but tend to have very similar implications. They result in non-additive pricing
functionals that are often additive on comonotonic risks, and that can be expressed as a
worst-case expectation over a set of probability distribution outcomes. Wang (1996) and
Wang, Young, and Panjer (1997) apply a non-additive functional using distorted probabilities
to insurance pricing, leveraging diverse theoretical underpinnings including Huber (1981),
Schmeidler (1986), Schmeidler (1989), Yaari (1987), and Denneberg (1994). Within this
theory, distortion risk measures (DRM) occur repeatedly and in many guises. Kusuoka (2001)
and Acerbi (2002) characterize DRMs as coherent, law invariant, and comonotonic additive
functionals.
DRMs are easy to apply in practice and have many appealing properties. However, they are not
additive and include transaction costs, via an implied bid-ask spread, Castagnoli, Maccheroni,
and Marinacci (2004). We must ask whether they are consistent with arbitrage-free pricing.
Fortunately, the answer is yes. The presence of transaction costs render apparent arbitrage
opportunities impractical and so a non-additive pricing rule can still be arbitrage-free.
Results from Chateauneuf, Kast, and Lapied (1996), De Waegenaere (2000), and especially
Castagnoli, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2002) and De Waegenaere, Kast, and Lapied (2003)
produce general equilibrium models that allow for non-additive prices, and show that DRM
pricing—in the equivalent guise as a Choquet integral—is consistent with general equilibrium.
As a result, it is legitimate to use DRMs to price risk transfer. They return a premium
that charges for the shape of risk, even diversifiable risk. DRMs can be applied both to
non-intermediated, direct-to-investor pricing and insurer intermediated pricing, where insurers
sell the risk to investors.
Why is it reasonable to charge for the shape of risk, especially when it is diversifiable? There
are two related reasons: ambiguity aversion and winner’s curse.
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Insurance pricing is a horse lottery, not a roulette lottery; it relies on subjective probabilities
Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Losses are ambiguous and investors are ambiguity averse.
Zhang (2002) and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) describe ambiguity relevant to
insurance pricing. The latter paper has been applied in an insurance context by Robert and
Therond (2014), Dietz and Walker (2017) and Jiang, Escobar-Anel, and Ren (2020). Epstein
and Schneider (2008) can be applied equally to underwriters who often weight bad news more
heavily than good. Premium ambiguity is confounded with risk because more risky classes
of business tend to have more ambiguous premiums. The failure of the terrorism insurance
market is a case in point.
The second reason is the winner’s curse: the winning bid is biased low when there are multiple
quotes, Thaler (1988). The insurance market is very competitive and is characterized by
big-data, predictive modeling pricing with heterogeneous insureds. Competing classification
plans exacerbate winner’s curse. As a result, a margin over subjective expected loss, even
when subjective probabilities are unbiased, is justified. Winner’s curse will be correlated
to ambiguity: greater ambiguity will result in wider quote dispersion. The winner’s curse
margin will appear in quotes but will not appear ex post in results. The winner’s curse is
distinct from adverse selection, D’Arcy and Doherty (1990)
In this paper, we consider applying a DRM pricing functional to individual policies. We do
this in two steps. First, we consider pricing without insurers and associated frictional costs.
In this world, insureds contract directly with investor capital providers. The capital providers
can be risk-neutral, but they are ambiguity averse. Uncertain subjective probabilities drive
the market; there are no objective probabilities. Investors may be willing to write a roulette
lottery at cost, but they are unwilling to write a horse lottery at cost because they are
ambiguity averse and because they know their winning quotes will be biased below subjective
expectation. The DRM incorporates a margin to allow for ambiguity aversion and help
correct for the winner’s curse.
Non-additive DRMs create a benefit to independent insureds who pool their risks. Estimation
risk, process risk, and entropy are all lower for the pool than for the individual risks, resulting
in less ambiguous subjective probabilities. Pool pricing is closer to the subjective expected
value, lowering the average premium for pool participants. These conclusions do not hold if the
insureds are not independent, for example if the risk is driven by catastrophe events. Boonen,
Tsanakas, and Wüthrich (2017) and Mildenhall (2017) discuss the important differences
between the independent and dependent cases.
Pool members still have the problem of allocating any gains from diversification. We show
there is a unique way to do this consistent with the value of insurance cash flows and an
assumption of equal priority in default, but relying on no other inputs. We call our method
the natural allocation. Our approach is similar to Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2010). We
model fair value to insureds rather than marginal costs to the pool. The pool is a transparent,
contractual pass-through.
Our method identifies the conditional expectation of policy losses given total pool loss as
a controlling function, which we call κ. It is exquisitely sensitive to relative risk within a
portfolio. We explain our allocation in reference to the relative consumption of more or less
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ambiguous, and hence costly, capital layers.
Risk pools have a clear role in our model: they minimize ambiguity-based risk costs. Pools
accumulate risk to create more credible pricing signals, credible being synonymous with
stable and low volatility. Stable pools will be financed more cheaply by investors than more
ambiguous pools, or than single risks. A similar data-centric role for insurance pools was
suggested in Froot and O’Connell (2008).
A risk pool does not have to be structured as an insurance company intermediary. Intermedi-
aries emerge as pool managers look to bolster their credibility with investors by putting skin
in the game and assuming risk. This provides a solid rationale for the existence of insurers
versus pools managed by non-risk bearing underwriting managers. Interestingly, non-risk-
bearing managers are now quite common in the property catastrophe reinsurance market.
There, credibility is enhanced by reliance on independent and highly regarded third-party
catastrophe models. Such models do not exist for most lines. Generally, aggregated data is
needed to price individual policies fairly.
Insurance company pools are successful if they lower the cost of pure risk transfer by an
amount that more than offsets their frictional costs of holding capital. Individual policy
pricing still requires an allocation of frictional costs. Since frictional costs are usually regarded
as a flat tax on capital, this can be done via a capital allocation. We show there is a unique
“natural” way to perform the allocation, giving a complete solution to pooled risk insurance
pricing under a DRM. Like the premium allocation, the capital allocation only assumes
aggregate pricing by a DRM and equal priority in default. It relies on the fact that DRMs
are law invariant.
Although many of the results in the paper have been known, at least in principle, for many
years, we believe it contains several noteworthy results. In particular, we highlight the
following contributions.
• We analyze multiline pricing and capital allocation in equilibrium no-arbitrage markets.
We address the allocation of risk measures from the insured’s perspective, as in Ibragimov,
Jaffee, and Walden (2010), but generalize their work to pricing in imperfect and
incomplete markets with non-additive functionals.
• We find there is a canonical allocation of premium and margin in a market where prices
are determined by a distortion risk measure with a rule of equal priority in default. The
allocation relies on no additional assumptions and we believe it merits the name the
natural allocation. The natural allocation gives non-negative margins to all independent
lines for default-free insurance but can exhibit negative margins for low-risk lines under
limited liability. The natural allocation reveals subtle interactions between margin,
default, and idiosyncratic risk.
• We introduce novel conditional expectation measures of relative risk within a portfolio
and use them to derive simple, intuitively appealing expressions for risk margins and
capital allocations consistent with law invariant DRM pricing functionals.
• We give a unique capital allocation consistent with our law invariant pricing functional.
Such allocations produce returns that vary by line, in contrast to many other approaches.
• We illustrate the theory with examples. The examples elucidate the interplay of loss
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and margin between lines at various levels of portfolio risk. We demonstrate how the
cost of the shape of risk reflects a complex interaction between the relative consumption
of low layer, certain, high loss ratio assets, and high layer, uncertain, low loss ratio
assets.
• In contrast with cost allocation-based approaches, we find that margin by line is more
driven by behavior in solvent states than in default states. Our results hold even when
there is no possibility of default.
• Our model provides a bridge between the theoretical perspective that there should be
no compensation for bearing diversifiable risk and the empirical observation that more
risky lines fetch higher margins relative to subjective expected values.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls the definition and
properties of a DRM. Section 3 states and proves canonical formulas giving the natural
allocation of loss and premium by policy under a DRM, and shows margins are non-negative
for independent risks. Section 4 discusses the κ and two associated functions that control
the natural allocation and that are informative in their own right. Section 5 derives some
properties of the natural margin allocation by policy. Section 6 extends the natural premium
allocation to a natural allocation of capital. This allows frictional costs to be allocated.
Section 7 gives two examples, one simple and one more realistic. Finally, Section 8 offers
concluding remarks, discusses limitations, and makes suggestions for further research.
Notation and Conventions
We consider insurance written directly by investors or intermediated by an insurance company.
We distinguish, when necessary, by saying investor-written, or intermediary-written or
intermediated insurance. When irrelevant, we just say the insurance is written by a provider.
In either case, insurance consists of a pool of individual policies written for insureds. Policies
last one period, with premium collected at t = 0 and losses paid in full at t = 1. Line of
business or business unit or other grouping can be substituted for policy. We refer to the
components as lines or policies, whichever is most appropriate.
When insurance is supported by finite assets, the provider has limited liability.
When intermediated, the intermediary is a stock insurer. At t = 0 it sells its residual value
to investors to raise equity. At time one it pays claims up to the amount of assets available.
If assets are insufficient to pay claims it defaults. If there are excess assets they are returned
to investors.
The terminology describing risk measures is standard, and follows Föllmer and Schied (2011).
We work on a standard probability space, Svindland (2009), Appendix. It can be taken as
Ω = [0, 1], with the Borel sigma-algebra and P Lebesgue measure. The indicator function on
a set A is 1A, meaning 1A(x) = 1 if x ∈ A and 1A(x) = 0 otherwise.
Total insured loss, or total risk, is described by a random variable X ≥ 0. X reflects policy
limits but is not limited by provider assets. X = ∑iXi describes the split of losses by policy.
F , S, f , and q are the distribution, survival, density, and (lower) quantile functions of X.
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Subscripts are used to disambiguate, e.g., SXi is the survival function of Xi. X ∧ a denotes
min(X, a) and X+ = max(X, 0).
The letters S, P , M and Q refer to expected loss, premium, margin and equity, and a refers
to assets. The value of survival function S(x) is the loss cost of the insurance paying 1{X>x},
so the two uses of S are consistent. Premium equals expected loss plus margin; assets equal
premium plus equity. All these quantities are functions of assets underlying the insurance.
We use the actuarial sign convention: large positive values are bad. Our concern is with
quantiles q(p) for p near 1. Distortions are usually reversed, with g(s) for small s = 1− p
corresponding to bad outcomes. As far as possible we will use p in the context p close to 1 is
bad and s when small s is bad.
Tail value at risk is defined for 0 ≤ p < 1 by
TVaRp(X) =
1
1− p
∫ 1
p
q(t)dt.
Prices exclude all expenses. The risk free interest rate is zero. These are standard simplifying
assumptions, e.g. Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2010).
2 Distortion Risk Measures and Pricing Functionals
We define DRMs and recall results describing their different representations. By De Wae-
genaere, Kast, and Lapied (2003) DRMs are consistent with general equilibrium and so it
makes sense to consider them as pricing functionals. The DRM is interpreted as the (ask)
price for an investor-written risk transfer. The rest of the paper will explore multi-policy
pricing implied by a DRM.
Definition 1. A distortion function is an increasing concave function g : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
satisfying g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
A distortion risk measure ρg associated with a distortion g acts on a non-negative random
variable X as
ρg(X) =
∫ ∞
0
g(S(x))dx. (1)
The simplest distortion if the identity g(s) = s. Then ρg(X) = E[X] from the integration-by-
parts identity ∫ ∞
0
S(x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
xdF (x).
Other well-known distortions include the proportional hazard g(s) = sr for 0 < r ≤ 1 and
the Wang transform g(s) = Φ(Φ−1(s) + λ) for λ ≥ 0, Wang (1995).
Since g is concave g(s) ≥ 0g(0) + sg(1) = s for all 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, showing ρg adds a non-negative
margin.
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Going forward, g is a distortion and ρ is its associated distortion risk measure. We interpret
ρ as a pricing functional and refer to ρ(X) as the price or premium for investor-written
insurance on X. When we price intermediated insurance we need to add frictional costs of
holding capital. This is considered in section 6.2.
DRMs are translation invariant, monotonic, subadditive and positive homogeneous, and hence
coherent, Acerbi (2002). In addition they are law invariant and comonotonic additive. In
fact, all such functionals are DRMs. As well has having these properties, DRMs are powerful
because we have a complete understanding of their representation and structure, which we
summarize in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Subject to ρ satisfying certain continuity assumptions, the following are equiva-
lent.
1. ρ is a law invariant, coherent, comonotonic additive risk measure.
2. ρ = ρg for a concave distortion g.
3. ρ has a representation as a weighted average of TVaRs for a measure µ on [0, 1]
ρ(X) =
∫ 1
0 TVaRp(X)µ(dp).
4. ρ(X) = maxQ∈Q EQ[X] where Q is the set of (finitely) additive measures with Q(A) ≤
g(P(A)) for all measurable A.
5. ρ(X) = maxZ∈Z E[XZ] where Z is the set of positive functions on Ω satisfying∫ 1
p qZ(t)dt ≤ g(1− p), and qZ is the quantile function of Z.
The theorem combines results from Föllmer and Schied (2011) (4.79, 4.80, 4.93, 4.94, 4.95),
Delbaen (2000), Kusuoka (2001), and Carlier and Dana (2003). The theorem requires that ρ
is continuous from above to rule out the possibility ρ = sup. In certain situations, the sup
risk measure applied to an unbounded random variable can only be represented as a sup
over a set of test measures and not a max. Note that the roles of from above and below are
swapped from Föllmer and Schied (2011) because they use the asset, negative is bad, sign
convention whereas we use the actuarial, positive is bad, convention.
The relationship between µ and g is given by Föllmer and Schied (2011) 4.69 and 4.70. The
elements of Z are the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of the measures in Q.
3 Loss and Premium by Policy and Layer
This section introduces the idea of layer densities and proves that DRM premium can be
allocated to policy in a natural and unique way.
3.1 Layer Densities
Risk is often tranched into layers that are then insured and priced separately. Meyers (1996)
describes layering in the context of liability increased limits factors and Culp and O’Donnell
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(2009), Mango et al. (2013) in the context of excess of loss reinsurance.
Define a layer y excess x by its payout function I(x,x+y](X) := (X − x)+ ∧ y. The expected
layer loss is
E[I(x,x+y](X)] =
∫ x+y
x
(t− x)dF (t) + yS(x+ y)
=
∫ x+y
x
tdF (t) + tS(t)|x+yx
=
∫ x+y
x
S(t) dt.
Based on this equation, Wang (1996) points out that S can be interpreted as the layer loss
(net premium) density. Specifically, S is the layer loss density in the sense that S(x) =
d/dx(E[I(0,x](X)]) is the marginal rate of increase in expected losses in the layer at x. We
use density in this sense to define premium, margin and equity densities, in addition to loss
density.
Clearly S(x) equals the expected loss to the cover 1{X>x}. By scaling, S(x)dx is the close to
the expected loss for I(x,x+dx] when dx is very small; Bodoff (2007) calls these infinitesimal
layers.
Wang (1996) goes on to interpret ∫ x+y
x
g(S(t)) dt
as the layer premium and hence g(S(x)) as the layer premium density. We write P (x) :=
g(S(x)) for the premium density.
We can decompose X into a sum of thin layers. All these layers are comonotonic with one
another and with X, resulting in an additive decomposition of ρ(X), since ρ is comonotonic
additive. The decomposition mirrors the definition of ρ as an integral, eq. (1).
The amount of assets a available to pay claims determines the quality of insurance, and
premium and expected losses are functions of a. Premiums are well-known to be sensitive
to the insurer’s asset resources and solvency, Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998). Assets
may be infinite, implying unlimited cover. When a is finite there is usually some chance of
default. Using the layer density view, define expected loss S¯ and premium P¯ functions as
S¯(a) := E[X ∧ a] =
∫ a
0
S(x) dx (2)
P¯ (a) := ρ(X ∧ a) =
∫ ∞
0
g(SX∧a(x)) dx =
∫ a
0
g(SX(x))dx. (3)
Margin is M¯(a) := P¯ (a)− S¯(a) and margin density is M(a) = dM¯(a)/da. Assets are funded
by premium and equity Q¯(a) := a− P¯ (a). Again Q(a) = dQ¯/da = 1− P (a). Together S, M ,
and Q give the split of layer funding between expected loss, margin and equity. Layers up to
a are, by definition, fully collateralized. Thus ρ(X ∧ a) is the premium for a defaultable cover
on X supported by assets a, whereas ρ(X) is the premium for an unlimited, default-free
cover.
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The layer density view is consistent with more standard approaches to pricing. If X is a
Bernoulli risk with Pr(X = 1) = s and expected loss cost s, then ρ(X) = g(s) can be regarded
as pricing a unit width layer with attachment probability s. In an intermediated context, the
funding constraint requires layers to be fully collateralized by premium plus equity—without
such funding the insurance would not be credible since the insurer has no other source of
funds.
Given g we can compute insurance market statistics for each layer. The loss, premium,
margin, and equity densities are s, g(s), g(s)− s and 1− g(s). The layer loss ratio is s/g(s)
and (g(s) − s)/(1 − g(s)) is the layer return on equity. These quantities are illustrated in
fig. 1 for a typical distortion function. The corresponding statistics for ground-up covers can
be computed by integrating densities.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
s
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
g
(s
)
loss = s
margin = g(s)− s
equity =
1− g(s)
premium = g(s)
Insurance Statistics
Wang-normal 0.730
Figure 1: Relationship between distortion g and insurance market statistics as a function of
exceedance probability s.
For an investor-written risk we regard the margin as compensation for ambiguity aversion
and associated winner’s curse drag. Both of these effects are correlated with risk, so the
margin is hard to distinguish from a risk load, but the rationale is different. Again, recall,
although ρ is non-additive and appears to charge for diversifiable risk, De Waegenaere, Kast,
and Lapied (2003) assures us the pricing is consistent with a general equilibrium.
The layer density is distinct from models that vary the volume of each line in a homogeneous
portfolio model. Our portfolio is static. By varying assets we are implicitly varying the
quality of insurance.
3.2 The Equal Priority Default Rule
If assets are finite and the provider has limited liability we need to to determine policy-level
cash flows in default states before we can determine the fair market value of insurance. The
most common way to do this is using equal priority in default.
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Under limited liability, total losses are split between provider payments and provider default
as
X = X ∧ a+ (X − a)+.
Next, actual payments X ∧ a must be allocated to each policy.
Xi is the amount promised to i by their insurance contract. Promises are limited by policy
provisions but are not limited by provider assets. At the policy level, equal priority implies
the payments made to, and default borne by, policy i are split as
Xi = Xi
X ∧ a
X
+Xi
(X − a)+
X
= (payments to policy i) + (default borne by policy i).
Therefore the payments made to policy i are given by
Xi(a) := Xi
X ∧ a
X
=
Xi X ≤ aXi a
X
X > a.
(4)
Xi(a) is the amount actually paid to policy i. It depends on a, X and Xi. The dependence on
X is critical. It is responsible for almost all the theoretical complexity of insurance pricing.
It is worth reiterating that with this definition ∑iXi(a) = X ∧ a.
Example. Here is an example illustrating the effect of equal priority. Consider a certain
loss X0 = 1000 and X1 given by a lognormal with mean 1000 and coefficient of variation 2.0.
Prudence requires losses be backed by assets equal to the 0.9 quantile. On a stand-alone
basis X0 is backed by a0 = 1000 and is risk-free. X1 is backed by a1 = 2272 and the recovery
is subject to a considerable haircut, since E[X1 ∧ 2272] = 732.3. If these risks are pooled,
the pool must hold a = a0 + a1 for the same level of prudence. When X1 ≤ a1 both lines
are paid in full. But when X1 > a1, X0 receives 1000(a/(1000 + X1)) and X1 receives the
remaining X1(a/(1000 +X1)). Payment to both lines is pro rated down by the same factor
a/(1000 +X1)—hence the name equal priority. In the pooled case, the expected recovery to
X0 is 967.5 and 764.8 to X1. Pooling and equal priority result in a transfer of 32.5 from X0
to X1. This example shows what can occur when a thin tailed line pools with a thick tailed
one under a weak capital standard with equal priority. We shall see how pricing compensates
for these loss payment transfers, with X1 paying a positive margin and X0 a negative one.
3.3 Expected Loss Payments at Different Asset Levels
Expected losses paid to policy i are S¯i(a) := E[Xi(a)]. S¯i(a) can be computed, conditioning
on X, as
S¯i(a) = E[E[Xi(a) | X]] = E[Xi | X ≤ a]F (a) + aE
[
Xi
X
| X > a
]
S(a). (5)
Because of its importance in allocating losses, define
αi(a) := E[Xi/X | X > a]. (6)
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The value αi(x) is the expected proportion of recoveries by line i in the layer at x. Since total
assets available to pay losses always equals the layer width, and the chance the layer attaches
is S(x), it is intuitively clear αi(x)S(x) is the loss density for line i, that is, the derivative of
S¯i(x) with respect to x. We now show this rigorously.
Proposition 1. Expected losses to policy i under equal priority, when total losses are supported
by assets a, is given by
S¯i(a) = E[Xi(a)] =
∫ a
0
αi(x)S(x)dx (7)
and so the policy loss density at x is Si(x) := αi(x)S(x).
Proof. By the definition of conditional expectation, αi(a)S(a) = E[(Xi/X)1X>a]. Condi-
tioning on X, using the tower property, and taking out the functions of X on the right
shows
αi(a)S(a) = E[E[(Xi/X)1X>a | X]] =
∫ ∞
a
E[Xi | X = x]f(x)
x
dx
and therefore
d
da
(αi(a)S(a)) = −E[Xi | X = a]f(a)
a
. (8)
Now we can use integration by parts to compute∫ a
0
αi(x)S(x) dx = xαi(x)S(x)
∣∣∣∣a
0
+
∫ a
0
xE[Xi | X = x]f(x)
x
dx
= aαi(a)S(a) + E[Xi | X ≤ a]F (a)
= S¯i(a)
by eq. (5). Therefore the policy i loss density in the asset layer at a, i.e. the derivative of
eq. (5) with respect to a, is Si(a) = αi(a)S(a) as required.
To recap, eq. (7) gives a direct analog to eq. (2) for policy i losses. Note that Si is not
the survival function of Xi(a) nor of Xi. Equation (7) is surprising because it gives a
decomposition of S through the convolution of random variables:
X
∑
iXi X ∧ a
∑
iXi(a)
E[X] ∑i E[Xi] E[X ∧ a] ∑i E[Xi(a)]
∫
S
∑
i
∫
SXi
∫ a
0
S
∑
i
∫ a
0
αiS
S
∑
SXi , S
∑
αiS.
= =
=
= =
=
= =
= =
6= =
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3.4 Premiums at Different Asset Levels
Premium under ρ is given by eq. (3). We can interpret g(S(a)) as the portfolio premium
density in the layer at a. We now consider the premium and premium density for each policy.
Using integration by parts we can express the price of an unlimited cover on X as
ρ(X) =
∫ ∞
0
g(S(x)) dx =
∫ ∞
0
xg′(S(x))f(x) dx = E[Xg′(S(X)))]. (9)
It is important that this integral is over all x ≥ 0 so the xg(S(x))|a0 term disappears.
Equation (9) makes sense because a concave distortion is continuous on (0, 1] and can have at
most countably infinitely many points where it is not differentiable (it has a kink). In total
these points have measure zero, Borwein and Vanderwerff (2010), and we can ignore them in
the integral. For more details see Dhaene et al. (2012).
By Equation (9), and the properties of a distortion function, g′(S(X)) is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of a measure Q with ρ(X) = EQ[X]. In fact, EQ[Y ] = E[Y g′(S(X))] for all random
variables Y . In general, any non-negative function Z (measure Q) with E[Z] = 1 and
ρ(X) = E[XZ] (= EQ[X]) is called a contact function (subgradient) for ρ at X, see Shapiro,
Dentcheva, and Ruszczyński (2009). Thus g′(S(X)) is a contact function for ρ at X. The
name subgradient comes from the fact that ρ(X + Y ) ≥ EQ[X + Y ] = ρ(X) + EQ[Y ], by
theorem 1. The set of subgradients is called the subdifferential of ρ at X. If there is a unique
subgradient then ρ is differentiable. Delbaen (2000) Theorem 17 shows that subgradients are
contact functions.
We can interpret g′(S(X)) as a state price density specific to the X, suggesting that
E[Xig′(S(X))] gives the value of the cash flows to policy i. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 2. For X = ∑iXi with Q ∈ Q so that ρ(X) = EQ[X], the natural allocation
premium to policy Xj as part of the portfolio X is EQ[Xj]. It is denoted ρX(Xj).
The natural allocation premium is a standard approach, appearing in Delbaen (2000), Venter,
Major, and Kreps (2006) and Tsanakas and Barnett (2003) for example. It has many desirable
properties. Delbaen shows it is a fair allocation in the sense of fuzzy games and that it has a
directional derivative, marginal interpretation when ρ is differentiable. It is consistent with
Jouini and Kallal (2001) and Campi, Jouini, and Porte (2013), which show the rational price
of X in a market with frictions must be computed by state prices that are anti-comonotonic
X. In our application the signs are reversed: g′(S(X)) and X are comonotonic.
The choice g′(S(X)) is economically meaningful because it weights the largest outcomes of
X the most, which is appropriate from a social, regulatory and investor perspective. It is
also the only choice of weights that works for all levels of assets. Since investors stand ready
to write any layer at the price determined by g, their solution must work for all a.
However, there are two technical issues with the proposed natural allocation. First, unlike
prior works, we are allocating the premium for X ∧ a, not X, a problem also considered in
Major (2018). And second, Q may not be unique. In general, uniqueness fails at capped
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variables like X ∧ a. Both issues are surmountable for a DRM, resulting in a unique, well
defined natural allocation. For a non-comonotonic additive risk measure this is not the case.
It is helpful to define the premium, risk adjusted, analog of the αi as
βi(a) := EQ[(Xi/X) | X > a]. (10)
βi(x) is the value of the recoveries paid to line i by a policy paying 1 in states {X > a},
i.e. an allocation of the premium for 1X>a. By the properties of conditional expectations, we
have
βi(a) =
E[(Xi/X)Z | X > a]
E[Z | X > a] . (11)
The denominator equals Q(X > a)/P(X > a). Remember that while EQ[X] = E[XZ], for
conditional expectations EQ[X | F ] = E[XZ | F ]/E[Z | F ], see Föllmer and Schied (2011),
Proposition A.12.
To compute αi and βi we use a third function,
κi(x) := E[Xi | X = x], (12)
the conditional expectation of loss by policy, given the total loss. It is an important fact that
the risk adjusted version of κ is unchanged because DRMs are law invariant. With these
preliminaries we can state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 2. Let Q ∈ Q be the measure with Radon-Nikodym derivative Z = g′(SX(X)).
1. E[Xi | X = x] = EQ[Xi | X = x].
2. βi can be computed from κi as
βi(a) =
1
Q(X > a)
∫ ∞
a
κi(x)
x
g′(S(x))f(x) dx. (13)
3. The natural allocation premium for policy i under equal priority when total losses are
supported by assets a, P¯i(a) := ρX∧a(Xi(a)), is given by
P¯i(a) = EQ[Xi | X ≤ a](1− g(S(a))) + aEQ[Xi/X | X > a]g(S(a)) (14)
= E[XiZ | X ≤ a](1− S(a)) + aE[(Xi/X)Z | X > a]S(a). (15)
4. The policy i premium density is
Pi(a) = βi(a)g(S(a)). (16)
The Theorem offers two contributions. First, it shows we can replace EQ[Xi | X] with
E[Xi | X], which enables explicit calculation. There is no risk adjusted version of κi.
Intuitively, a law invariant risk measure cannot change probabilities within an event defined
by X: if it did then it would be distinguishing between events on information other than
S(X) whereas law invariance says this is all that can matter. And second, it identifies the
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premium density eq. (16), giving an allocation of eq. (3) and a premium analog of eq. (7).
It provides a clear and illuminating way to visualize risk by collapsing a multidimensional
problem to one dimension, see fig. 2. Part (4) provides a direct premium analog of eq. (5)
and part (5) an analog of eq. (7). Equation (14) is the same as Tsanakas and Barnett (2003)
eq. (19), although their derivation is in the context of a homogeneous portfolio whereas our
portfolio is static.
Proof. Part (1) follows in the same way as eq. (11).
Since ρ is comonotonic additive ρ(X) = ρ(X ∧ a) + ρ((X − a)+) and hence ρ(X) = EQ[X ∧
a] + EQ[(X − a)+] ≤ ρ(X ∧ a) + ρ((X − a)+) = ρ(X). But since EQ[X ∧ a] ≤ ρ(X ∧ a) and
EQ[(X−a)+] ≤ ρ((X−a)+) it follows EQ[X ∧a] = ρ(X ∧a) and EQ[(X−a)+] = ρ((X−a)+).
Therefore the contact functions for X and X ∧ a are the same and it is legitimate to assume
Z = g′(S(X)) when allocating premium for X ∧ a.
To prove Part (2), note that by eq. (11) βi(a)g(S(a)) = EQ[(Xi/X)1X>a]. Conditioning on
X, using the tower property, and taking out the known functions of X on the right, shows
βi(a)g(S(a)) = E[E[(Xi/X)g′(S(X))1X>a | X]]
= E[(E[(Xi | X]/X)g′(S(X))1X>a]]
=
∫ ∞
a
E[Xi | X = x]
x
g′(S(x))f(x) dx.
It follows from the definition of Xi(a), eq. (4), and the fact Z is a contact function for X ∧ a
that
P¯i(a) = E[Xi(a)g′(S(X))]
= E[Xig′(S(X))1X≤a] + E[a(Xi/X)g′(S(X))1X>a]
= E[Xig′(S(X)) | X ≤ a](1− S(a))+
aE[(Xi/X)g′(S(X)) | X > a]S(a)
= EQ[Xi | X ≤ a](1− g(S(a)))+
aEQ[(Xi/X) | X > a]g(S(a)),
giving Part (3).
Rearranging eq. (13) and differentiating gives
d
da
(βi(a)g(S(a))) = −E[Xi | X = a]
a
g′(S(a))f(a).
Now use integration by parts to compute∫ a
0
βi(x)g(S(x)) dx = xβi(x)g(S(x))
∣∣∣∣a
0
+
∫ a
0
x
E[Xi | X = x]
x
g′(S(x))f(x) dx
= aβi(a)g(S(a)) + EQ[Xi | X ≤ a](1− g(S(a))
= P¯i(a)
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by eq. (14). As a result, the policy i premium density in the asset layer at a, i.e. the derivative
of P¯i(a) with respect to a, is Pi(a) = βi(a)g(S(a)), giving Part (4).
The proof writes the price of a limited liability cover as the price of default-free protection
minus the value of the default put. This is the standard starting point for allocation in a
perfect competitive market taken by Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998), Myers and Read
Jr. (2001), Sherris (2006), and Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2010). They then allocate the
default put rather than the value of insurance payments directly.
The problem that can occur when Q is not unique, but that can be circumvented when ρ
is a DRM, can be illustrated as follows. Suppose ρ is given by p-TVaR. The measure Q
weights the worst 1 − p proportion of outcomes of X by a factor of (1 − p)−1 and ignores
the others. Suppose a is chosen as p′-VaR for a lower threshold p′ < p. Let Xa = X ∧ a
be capped insured losses and C = {Xa = a}. By definition Pr(C) ≥ 1 − p′ > 1 − p. Pick
any A ⊂ C of measure 1 − p so that ρ(X) = E[X | A]. Let ψ be a measure preserving
transformation of Ω that acts non-trivially on C but trivially off C. Then Q′ = Qψ will
satisfy EQ′ [Xa] = EQ[Xaψ−1] = ρ(Xa) but in general EQ′ [X] < ρ(X). The natural allocation
with respect to Q′ will be different from that for Q. The theorem isolates a specific Q to
obtain a unique answer. The same idea applies to Q from other, non-TVaR, ρ: you can
always shuffle part of the contact function within C to generate non-unique allocations. See
section 7.1 for an example.
To recap: the premium formulas eqs. (14) and (16) have been derived assuming capital is
provided at a cost g and there is equal priority by line. They are computationally tractable
and require no other assumptions. There is no need to assume the Xi are independent. They
produce an entirely general, canonical determination of premium in the presence of shared
costly capital. This result extends Grundl and Schmeiser (2007), who pointed out that with
an additive pricing functional there is no need to allocate capital in order to price, to the
situation of a non-additive DRM pricing functional.
The key formulas we have derived are summarized in table 1.
4 Properties of Alpha, Beta, and Kappa
In this section we explore properties of αi, βi, and κi, see eq. (6), eq. (10), and eq. (12), and
show how they interact to determine premiums by line via the natural allocation.
For a measurable h, E[Xih(X)] = E[κi(X)h(X)] by the tower property. This simple observa-
tion results in huge simplifications. In general, E[Xih(X)] requires knowing the full bivariate
distribution of Xi and X. Using κi reduces it to a one dimensional problem. This is true
even if the Xi are correlated. The κi functions can be estimated from data using regression
and they provide an alternative way to model correlations.
Despite their central role, the κi functions are probably unfamiliar so we begin by giving
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several examples to illustrate how they behave. In general, they are non-linear and usually,
but not always, increasing.
4.1 Examples of κ functions
1. If Yi are independent and identically distributed and Xn = Y1 + · · ·+ Yn then E[Xm |
Xm+n = x] = mx/(m + n) for m ≥ 1, n ≥ 0. This is obvious when m = 1 because
the functions E[Yi | Xn] are independent across i = 1, . . . , n and sum to x. The result
follows because conditional expectations are linear. In this case κi(x) = mx/(m+ n) is
a line through the origin.
2. If Xi are multivariate normal then κi are straight lines, given by the usual least-squares
fits
κi(x) = E[Xi] +
cov(Xi, X)
var(X) (x− E[X]).
This example is familiar from the securities market line and the CAPM analysis of
stock returns. If Xi are iid it reduces to the previous example because the slope is 1/n.
3. If Xi, i = 1, 2, are compound Poisson with the same severity distribution then κi are
again lines through the origin. Suppose Xi has expected claim count λi. Write the
conditional expectation as an integral, expand the density of the compound Poisson
by conditioning on the claim count, and then swap the sum and integral to see that
κ1(x) = E[X1 | X1+X2 = x] = xE[N(λ1)/(N(λ1)+N(λ2))] whereN(λ) are independent
Poisson with mean λ. This example generalizes the iid case. Further conditioning on a
common mixing variable extends the result to mixed Poisson frequencies where each
aggregate can have a separate or shared mixing distribution. The common severity is
essential. The result means that if a line of business is defined to be a group of policies
that shares the same severity distribution, then premiums for policies within the line
will have rates proportional to their expected claim counts.
4. A theorem of Efron says that if Xi are independent and have log-concave densities
then all κi are non-decreasing, Saumard and Wellner (2014). The multivariate normal
example is a special case of Efron’s theorem.
Denuit and Dhaene (2012) define an ex post risk sharing rule called the conditional mean risk
allocation by taking κi(x) to be the allocation to policy i when X = x. A series of recent
papers, see Denuit and Robert (2020) and references therein, considers the properties of the
conditional mean risk allocation focusing on its use in peer-to-peer insurance and the case
when κi(x) is linear in x.
4.2 The Behavior of αi, βi
By definition αi(x) is the expected proportion of losses from policy i in 1{X>x} and βi(x) is
the risk adjusted proportion. They are average proportions not proportions of the averages:
17
αi(x) = E[Xi/X | X > x] 6= E[Xi | X > x]/E[X | X > x] because of Jensen’s inequality
applied to the convex function x 7→ 1/x.
To better understand the shape of αi and βi we can compute their derivatives. Differentiating
αi(x)S(x) = E[(Xi/X)1X>x] and re-arranging gives
α′i(x) =
(
αi(x)− κi(x)
x
)
f(x)
S(x) . (17)
The results for βi are analogous. The function h(x) := f(x)/S(x) is called the hazard
rate. If X models a lifetime, h is called the force of mortality. For thick right-skewed
distributions h is typically an eventually decreasing function. For thin tailed distributions it
is typically an eventually increasing function. It is constant for the exponential distribution.
The action of g is to make the right tail thicker and so to decrease the hazard rate. Since
h(x) = −d/dx(log(S(x))) it follows that
S(x) = exp
(
−
∫ ∞
t
h(s)ds
)
.
The integral is called the cumulative hazard function. From this formulation it is clear the
proportional hazard g(s) = sr, 0 < r ≤ 1, acts on the hazard function as multiplication by r,
hence justifying its name.
Equation (17) shows that α′i(x) = 0 if f(x) = 0 and S(x) close to 1, which will occur in the
extreme left tail when X includes some level of near certain losses. Then αi will be flat for
small x, while f(x) ≈ 0. Flat behavior can also occur if αi(x)− κi(x)/x = 0, but that is an
exceptional circumstance.
For thick tailed insurance distributions h(x) is eventually decreasing but remains strictly
positive. If κi(x)/x is decreasing then α′i(x) < 0 because αi(x) is the probability weighted
integral of κi(t)/t over t > x, and so αi(x) < κi(x)/x. Conversely if κi(x)/x is increasing
α′i(x) > 0.
Since ∑i κi(x) = x it follows that ∑i κ′i(x) = 1. It is typical for the thickest tail distribution,
i say, to behave like κi(x) ≈ x−∑j 6=i E[Xj] for large x. Then κ′i(x) = 1 and the remaining
κj(x) ≈ E[Xj ] are almost constant for large x. In that case κj(x)/x > αj(x) and so α′j(x) < 0
and α′i(x) > 0. To have two policies with αi increasing requires a very delicate balancing of
the thickness of their tails with κi(x), growing with order x. A compound Poisson with the
same severity is an example.
5 Properties of the Natural Allocation
5.1 Aggregate Properties
We now explore margin, equity, and return in total and by policy. We begin by considering
them in total.
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By definition the average return with assets a is
ι¯(a) := M¯(a)
Q¯(a)
(18)
where margin M¯ and equity Q¯ are defined in the paragraph following eq. (3).
Equation (18) has important implications. It tells us the investor priced expected return
varies with the level of assets. For most distortions return decreases with increasing capital.
In contrast, the standard RAROC models use a fixed average cost of capital, regardless of
the overall asset level, Tasche (1999). CAPM or the Fama-French three factor model are
often used to estimate the average return, with a typical range of 7 to 20 percent, Cummins
and Phillips (2005). A common question of working actuaries performing capital allocation is
about so-called excess capital, if the balance sheet contains more capital than is required by
regulators, rating agencies, or managerial prudence. Our model suggests that higher layers of
capital are cheaper, but not free, addressing this concern.
The varying returns in eq. (18) may seem inconsistent with Miller Modigliani. But that says
the cost of funding a given amount of capital is independent of how it is split between debt
and equity; it does not say the average cost is constant as the amount of capital varies.
5.2 No-Undercut and Positive Margin for Independent Risks
The natural allocation has two desirable properties. It is always less than the stand-alone
premium, meaning it satisfies the no-undercut condition of Denault (2001), and it produces
non-negative margins for independent risks.
Proposition 2. Let X = ∑ni=1Xi, Xi non-negative and independent, and let g be a distortion.
Then (1) the natural allocation is never greater than the stand-alone premium and (2) the
natural allocation to every Xi contains a non-negative margin.
Proof. It is enough to prove for n = 2 by considering X1 and X ′2 = X2 + · · ·+Xn.
By theorem 1 we know that ρ(X) = EQ[X] where Q has Radon-Nikodym derivative g′(SX(X)).
By definition, the natural allocation is P¯1 = E[X1g′(SX(X))]. Therefore,
P¯1 = E[X1g′(SX(X))] ≤ sup
Q∈Q
EQ[X] = ρ(X1)
which shows Part (1), that the natural allocation is never greater than the stand-alone
premium.
Let X˜1 = X1+E[X2] and X˜2 = X2−E[X2]. Then by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) or Machina
and Pratt (1997) X˜1 + X˜2 2 X˜1, where 2 denotes second order stochastic dominance.
Bäuerle and Müller (2006) shows that DRMs respect second order stochastic dominance.
Therefore
ρ(X˜1 + X˜2) ≥ ρ(X˜1).
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By translation invariance ρ(X˜1) = ρ(X1) + E[X2]. Since X˜1 + X˜2 = X1 +X2 we conclude
ρ(X1 +X2) ≥ ρ(X1) + E[X2].
Combining these results we get
P¯1 + P¯2 = ρ(X1 +X2) ≥ ρ(X1) + E[X2]
=⇒ P¯2 ≥ ρ(X1)− P¯1 + E[X2]
≥ E[X2]
as required for Part (2).
Part (1) is well known. The proof if Part (2) leverages the fact ρ is translation invariant. If
we add X2 = c to X1 then its natural allocation is c. In a sense, this is the best case. Any
non-constant independent variable, no matter how low its variance, must slightly increase
risk. It does not make sense to grant the new variable a credit off expected loss, when we
would not do so for a constant. A credit is possible for dependent variables, however.
Since P¯i = E[κi(X)g′(S(X))] we see the no-undercut condition holds if κi(X) and g′(S(X))
are comonotonic, and hence if κi is increasing, or if κi(X) and X are positively correlated
(recall E[g′(S(X))] = 1). Since ∑i κi(x) = x at least one κi, say κi∗ , must be increasing.
Policy i∗ is the capacity consuming line that will always have a positive margin. In this way
κ differentiates relative tail thickness.
5.3 Policy Level Properties, Varying with Asset Level
We start with a corollary of the results in section 3 which gives a nicely symmetric and
computationally tractable expression for the natural margin allocation in the case of finite
assets.
Corollary 1. The margin density for line i at asset level a is given by
Mi(a) = βi(a)g(S(a))− αi(a)S(a). (19)
Proof. Using eqs. (7) and (16) we can compute margin M¯i(a) in P¯i(a) by line as
M¯i(a) =P¯i(a)− L¯i(a)
=
∫ a
0
βi(x)g(S(x))− αi(x)S(x) dx. (20)
Differentiating we get the margin density for line i at a expressed in terms of αi and βi as
shown.
Margin in the current context is the cost of capital, thus eq. (19) is an important result. It
allows us to compute economic value by line and to assess static portfolio performance by
line—one of the motivations for performing capital allocation in the first place. In many ways
it is also a good place to stop. Remember these results only assume we are using a distortion
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risk measure and have equal priority in default. We are in a static model, so questions of
portfolio homogeneity are irrelevant. We are not assuming Xi are independent.
What does eq. (19) say about by margins by line? Since g is increasing and concave
P (a) = g(S(a)) ≥ S(a) for all a ≥ 0. Thus all asset layers contain a non-negative total
margin density. It is a different situation by line, where we can see
Mi(a) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ βi(a)g(S(a))− αi(a)S(a) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ βi(a)
αi(a)
≥ S(a)
g(S(a)) .
The line layer margin density is positive when βi/αi is greater than the all-lines layer loss
ratio. Since the loss ratio is ≤ 1 there must be a positive layer margin density whenever
βi(a)/αi(a) > 1. But when βi(a)/αi(a) < 1 it is possible the line has a negative margin
density. How can that occur and why does it make sense? To explore this we look at the
shape of α and β in more detail.
It is important to remember why proposition 2 does not apply: it assumes unlimited cover,
whereas here a <∞. With finite capital there are potential transfers between lines caused
by their behavior in default that overwhelm the positive margin implied by the proposition.
Also note the proposition cannot be applied to X ∧ a = ∑iXi(a) because the line payments
are no longer independent.
In general we can make two predictions about margins.
Prediction 1: Lines where αi(x) or κi(x)/x increase with x will have always have a positive
margin.
Prediction 2: A log-concave (thin tailed) line aggregated with a non-log-concave (thick
tailed) line can have a negative margin, especially for lower asset layers.
Prediction 1 follows because the risk adjustment puts more weight on Xi/X for larger X and
so βi(x)/αi(x) > 1 > S(x)/g(S(x)). Recall the risk adjustment is comonotonic with total
losses X.
A thin tailed line aggregated with thick tailed lines will have αi(x) decreasing with x. Now the
risk adjustment will produce βi(x) < αi(x) and it is possible that βi(x)/αi(x) < S(x)/g(S(x)).
In most cases, αi(x) approaches E[Xi]/x and βi(x)/αi(x) increases with x, while the layer
loss ratio decreases—and margin increases—and the thin line will eventually get a positive
margin. Whether or not the thin line has a positive total margin M¯i(a) > 0 depends on the
particulars of the lines and the level of assets a. A negative margin is more likely for less well
capitalized insurers, which makes sense because default states are more material and they
have a lower overall dollar cost of capital. In the independent case, as a→∞ proposition 2
eventually guarantees positive margins for all lines.
These results are reasonable. Under limited liability, if assets and liabilities are pooled then
the thick tailed line benefits from pooling with the thin one because pooling increases the
assets available to pay losses when needed. Equal priority transfers wealth from thin to thick
in states of the world where thick has a bad event, c.f., the example in section 3.2. But
because thick dominates the total, the total losses are bad when thick is bad. The negative
margin compensates the thin-tailed line for transfers.
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Another interesting situation occurs for asset levels within attritional loss layers. Most
realistic insured loss portfolios are quite skewed and never experience very low loss ratios.
For low loss layers, S(x) is close to 1 and the layer at x is funded almost entirely by expected
losses; the margin and equity density components are nearly zero. Since the sum of margin
densities over component lines equals the total margin density, when the total is zero it
necessarily follows that either all line margins are also zero or that some are positive and
some are negative. For the reasons noted above, thin tailed lines get the negative margin
as thick tailed lines compensate them for the improved cover the thick tail lines obtain by
pooling.
In conclusion, the natural margin by line reflects the relative consumption of assets by layer,
Mango (2005). Low layers are less ambiguous to the provider and have a lower margin relative
to expected loss. Higher layers are more ambiguous and have lower loss ratios. High risk
lines consume more higher layer assets and hence have a lower loss ratio. For independent
lines with no default the margin is always positive. But there is a confounding effect when
default is possible. Because more volatile lines are more likely to cause default, there is a
wealth transfer to them. The natural premium allocation compensates low risk policies for
this transfer, which can result in negative margins in some cases.
6 Equity Allocation by Policy
Although eq. (19) determines margin by line, we cannot compute return by line, or allocate
frictional costs of capital, because we still lack an equity allocation, a problem we now address.
6.1 The Natural Allocation of Equity
Definition 3. The natural allocation of equity to line i is given by
Qi(a) =
βi(a)g(S(a))− αi(x)S(a)
g(S(a))− S(a) × (1− g(S(a))). (21)
Why is this allocation natural? In total the layer return at a is
ι(a) := M(a)
Q(a) =
P (a)− S(a)
1− P (a) =
g(S(a))− S(a)
1− g(S(a)) .
We claim that for a law invariant pricing measure the layer return must be the same for
all lines. Law invariance implies the risk measure is only concerned with the attachment
probability of the layer at a, and not with the cause of loss within the layer. If return within
a layer varied by line then the risk measure could not be law invariant.
We can now compute capital by layer by line, by solving for the unknown equity density
Qi(a) via
ι(a) = M(a)
Q(a) =
Mi(a)
Qi(a)
=⇒ Qi(a) = Mi(a)
ι(a) .
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Substituting for layer return and line margin gives eq. (21).
Since 1− g(S(a)) is the proportion of capital in the layer at a, eq. (21) says the allocation to
line i is given by the nicely symmetric expression
βi(a)g(S(a))− αi(x)S(a)
g(S(a))− S(a) . (22)
To determine total capital by line we integrate the equity density
Q¯i(a) :=
∫ a
0
Qi(x)dx.
And finally we can determine the average return to line i at asset level a
ι¯i(a) =
M¯i(a)
Q¯i(a)
. (23)
The average return will generally vary by line and by asset level a. Although the return
within each layer is the same for all lines, the margin, the proportion of capital, and the
proportion attributable to each line all vary by a. Therefore average returns will vary by
line and a. This is in stark contrast to the standard industry approach, which uses the same
return for each line and implicitly all a. How these quantities vary by line is complicated.
Academic approaches emphasized the possibility that returns vary by line, but struggled with
parameterization, Myers and Cohn (1987).
Equation (23) shows the average return by line is an Mi-weighted harmonic mean of the layer
returns given by the distortion g, viz
1
ι¯i(a)
=
∫ a
0
1
ι(x)
Mi(x)
M¯i(a)
dx.
The harmonic mean solves the problem that the return for lower layers of assets is potentially
infinite (when g′(1) = 0). The infinities do not matter: at lower asset layers there is little or
no equity and the layer is fully funded by the loss component of premium. When so funded,
there is no margin and so the infinite return gets zero weight. In this instance, the sense of
the problem dictates that 0×∞ = 0: with no initial capital there is no final capital regardless
of the return.
6.2 Intermediated Pricing
An equity allocation to policy is needed to price intermediated insurance because of the
frictional costs of holding capital in an insurance company.
The price of investor-written insurance is ρ(X). A cat bond transaction is an example of
investor-written insurance. Following Myers and Read Jr. (2001) and Ibragimov, Jaffee, and
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Walden (2010) we model frictional costs as a tax on equity at rate δ. The density and limited
price of intermediated insurance becomes
P Ii (a) = Pi(a) + δQi(a) (24)
P¯ Ii (a) = P¯i(a) + δQ¯i(a). (25)
(26)
The relative size of Mi and δQi is a topic for future research.
7 Examples
7.1 Example 1: A Simple Discrete Example
Consider a two line example where X1 takes values 0, 9 and 10, and X2 values 0, 1 and 90,
the lines are independent and X = X1 +X2. Suppose the outcome probabilities are 1/2, 1/4,
and 1/4 respectively for each outcome and consider a risk measure given by the proportional
hazard transform g(s) =
√
s. There are nine possible outcomes shown in table 2. The natural
allocation appears to depend on the ordering of the two outcomes where X = 10. If these
two rows are swapped the allocations are different, as shown in the last two rows of the table.
Table 2: Nine possible outcomes showing ambiguous ordering for X = 10. The natural
allocation EQ[Xi] appears to depend on the ordering of outcomes 4 and 5. The next to last
row shows EQ with these rows swapped.
Outcome X1 X2 X P S(x) g(S) Q Z E[Z | X] Q˜
1 0 0 0 4/16 12/16 0.8660254 0.1339746 0.5358984 0.5358984 0.1339746
2 0 1 1 2/16 10/16 0.7905694 0.07545599 0.6036479 0.6036479 0.07545599
3 9 0 9 2/16 8/16 0.7071068 0.08346263 0.6677011 0.6677011 0.08346263
4 9 1 10 1/16 7/16 0.6614378 0.04566895 0.7307033 0.7898122 0.04936326
5 10 0 10 2/16 5/16 0.5590170 0.1024208 0.8193667 0.7898122 0.09872652
6 10 1 11 1/16 4/16 0.5 0.05901699 0.9442719 0.9442719 0.05901699
7 0 90 90 2/16 2/16 0.3535534 0.1464466 1.171573 1.171573 0.1464466
8 9 90 99 1/16 1/16 0.25 0.1035534 1.656854 1.656854 0.1035534
9 10 90 100 1/16 0 0 0.25 4 4 0.25
E 4.750000 22.75000 27.5
EQ 6.208543 45.18014 51.38869
Swap 4, 5 6.200857 45.18783 51.38869
Average 6.2046998 45.183985 0
The last three columns of the table compute the measure Q˜ corresponding to the unique
Q | X. The Q˜-expected values of X1 and X2 are 6.2048488 and 45.183836, respectively. Note
these values for the natural allocation are different from the average of the the two orderings
of rows 4 and 5.
Table 3 replaces Xi with κi(x) = E[Xi | X = x], resulting in one row per value of X, and uses
theorem 2 to compute expectations. The results are the same as using Q˜.
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Table 3: Combining outcomes 4 and 5 and working with E[Xi | X] resolves the ambiguity
and produces the natural allocation.
Outcome E[X1|X] E[X2|X] X P S(x) g(S) Q
1 0 0 0 4/16 12/16 0.8660254 0.1339746
2 0 1 1 2/16 10/16 0.7905694 0.07545599
3 9 0 9 2/16 8/16 0.7071068 0.08346263
4, 5 9 2/3 1 / 3 10 3/16 5/16 0.5590170 0.1480898
6 10 1 11 1/16 4/16 0.5 0.05901699
7 0 90 90 2/16 2/16 0.3535534 0.1464466
8 9 90 99 1/16 1/16 0.25 0.1035534
9 10 90 100 1/16 0 0 0.25
E 4.75 22.75 27.5
EQ 6.2048488 45.183836 51.38869
Actuaries commonly perform this type of calculation, often with catastrophe model output.
They make the simplifying assumption that Xi = E[Xi | X] when all rows are distinct.
However, the ordering problem illustrated does occur in real data, especially when limits and
retentions are involved. Theorem 2 shows how to rigorously resolve the ordering problem to
compute the unique natural allocation.
7.2 Example 2: Thick-tailed and Thin-tailed Lines
Example 2 is based on two distributions with mean 1. X1 is thin tailed with a gamma
distribution with coefficient of variation 0.25. X2 is a translated lognormal X2 = 0.3 + 0.7X ′2,
where X ′2 has a coefficient of variation 1.25/0.7, resulting in a coefficient of variation of 1.25
for X2. Total assets are 12.5, corresponding to capital at a 563 year return period. The
aggregate coefficient of variation is 0.637 in total. X1 approximates a moderate limit book
of commercial auto and X2 a catastrophe exposed property book with a stable attritional
loss component. In aggregate the portfolio would be considered as volatile. The distortion
g uses a Wang transform with λ = 0.755, producing a 10 percent return on assets. The
natural allocation premium is 1.057 for X1 and 1.889 for line (94.6 percent and 52.4 percent
loss ratios), producing an overall 67.6 percent loss ratio, all without expenses. The profit is
realistic for a gross portfolio with these characteristics.
Figure 2 illustrates the theory we have developed. We refer to the charts as (r, c) for row
r = 1, 2, 3, 4 and column c = 1, 2, 3, starting at the top left. The horizontal axis shows the
asset level in all charts except (3, 3) and (4, 3), where it shows probability, and (1, 3) where it
shows loss. Blue represents the thin tailed line, orange thick tailed and green total. When
both dashed and solid lines appear on the same plot, the solid represent risk-adjusted and
dashed represent non-risk-adjusted functions. Here is the key.
• (1, 1) shows density for X1, X2 and X = X1 +X2; the two lines are independent. Both
lines have mean 1.
• (1, 2): log density; comparing tail thickness.
• (1, 3): the bivariate log-density. This plot illustrates where (X1, X2) lives. The diagonal
lines show X = k for different k. These show that large values of X correspond to large
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values of X2, with X1 about average.
• (2, 1): the form of κi is clear from looking at (1, 3). κ1 peaks at x = 2.15 with maximum
value 1.14. Thereafter it declines to 1.0. κ2 is monotonically increasing.
• (2, 2): The αi functions. For small x the expected proportion of losses is approximately
50/50, since the means are equal. As x increases X2 dominates. The two functions sum
to 1.
• (2, 3): The solid lines are βi and the dashed lines αi from (2, 2). Since α1 decreases
β1(x) ≤ α1(x). This can lead to X1 having a negative margin in low asset layers. X2 is
the opposite.
• (3, 1): illustrates premium and margin determination by asset layer for X1 using eq. (7)
and eq. (16). For low asset layers α1(x)S(x) > β1(x)g(S(x)) (dashed above solid)
corresponding to a negative margin. Beyond about x = 1.38 the lines cross and the
margin is positive.
• (4, 1): shows the same thing for X2. Since α2 is increasing, β2(x) > α2(x) for all x and
so all layers get a positive margin. The solid line β2gS is above the dashed α2S line.
• (3, 2): the layer margin densities. For low asset layers premium is fully funded by
loss with zero overall margin. X2 requires a positive margin and X1 a negative one,
reflecting the benefit the thick line receives from pooling in low layers. The overall
margin is always non-negative. Beyond x = 1.38, X1’s margin is also positive.
• (4, 2): the cumulative margin in premium by asset level. Total margin is zero in low
dollar-swapping layers and then increases. It is always non-negative. The curves in this
plot are the integrals of those in (3, 2) from 0 to x.
• (3, 3): shows stand-alone loss (1 − S(x), x) = (p, q(p)) (dashed) and premium (1 −
g(S(x)), x) = (p, q(1 − g−1(1 − p)) (solid, shifted left) for each line and total. The
margin is the shaded area between the two. Each set of three lines (solid or dashed)
does not add up vertically because of diversification. The same distortion g is applied
to each line to the stand-alone SXi . It is calibrated to produce a 10 percent return
overall. On a stand-alone basis, calculating capital by line to the same return period
as total, X1 is priced to a 83.5 percent loss ratio and X2 a 51.8 percent, producing an
average 64.0 percent, vs. 67.6 percent on a combined basis. Returns are 28.7 percent
and 9.6 percent respectively, averaging 10.9 percent, vs 10 percent on a combined basis.
• (4, 3): shows the natural allocation of loss and premium to each line. The total (green)
is the same as (3, 3). For each i, dashed shows (p,E[Xi | X = q(p)]), i.e. the expected
loss recovery conditioned on total losses X = q(p), and solid shows (p,E[Xi | X =
q(1− g−1(1− p))]), i.e. the natural premium allocation (see the bottom row of table 1).
Here the solid and dashed lines add up vertically: they are allocations of the total.
Looking vertically above p, the shaded areas show how the total margin at that loss
level is allocated between lines. X1 mostly consumes assets at low layers, and the blue
area is thicker for small p, corresponding to smaller total losses. For p close to 1, large
total losses, margin is dominated by X2 and in fact X1 gets a slight credit (dashed
above solid). The change in shape of the shaded margin area for X1 is particularly
evident: it shows X1 benefits from pooling and requires a lower overall margin. The
natural allocation returns are 5.3, 10.6 and 10.0 percent. The overall premium to
surplus leverage is 0.308 to 1; on an allocated basis it is 0.986 and 0.223 to 1 for each
line.
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There may appear to be a contradiction between figures (3, 2) and (4, 3) but it should be
noted that a particular p value in (4, 3) refers to different events on the dotted and solid lines.
Plots (3, 3) and (4, 3) explain why the thick line requires relatively more margin (0.698 out
of a total 0.728): its shape does not change when it is pooled with X1. In (3, 3) the green
shaded area is essentially an upwards shift of the orange, and the orange areas in (3, 3) and
(3, 4) are essentially the same. This means that adding X1 has virtually no impact on the
shape of X2; it is like adding a constant, as discussed after the proof of proposition 2. This
can also be seen in (4, 3) where the blue region is almost a straight line.
These shifts are illustrated in fig. 3. The left hand plot shows that the stand-alone margin
area for X2 shifted up by 1, the mean of X1, lies almost exactly over the total margin area
(orange over green). The right hand plot compares the stand-alone margin areas for each line
with the natural margin allocation. X2 is shifted up by 1 for clarity. Again, there is essentially
no difference for X2, especially in the expensive, large loss states where p is close to 1. X1 is
completely transformed: its margin is much lower (smaller area) and it is concentrated in low
p, small total loss events. X1 actually gets a credit at large total losses because its losses
will be close to the mean, and hence low ambiguity, whereas X2’s loss will be large and more
ambiguous.
8 Conclusions
We have explored how the shape of risk impacts the price of risk transfer in an imperfect,
incomplete market—a holy grail for practicing actuaries. We provide a natural, assumption-
free allocation of aggregate premium to policy, incorporating an allocation of capital consistent
with law invariance in order to price individual policies in the presence of frictional costs.
Premium by policy is determined by the relative consumption of low and high ambiguity
assets in a complex, but intuitively reasonable manner. The margin by line is driven more
by behavior in solvent states than in default states (default states are often the major focus
of allocation methods). Premium is interpreted as the value of insurance cash flows under
a risk-dependent state price density. This is in contrast to most other approaches that
adopt a cost allocation perspective. The natural allocation is insured-centric, rather than
insurer-centric.
The natural allocation depends on the fact that DRMs are law invariant and comonotonic
additive. It does not apply to more general convex risk measures. Notwithstanding this
limitation, it provides a useful and practical method that can be applied by an insurance
company to understand how to share its diversification benefit between policies.
Further research is needed to determine how the shapes of the Xi interact to determine the
natural allocation, as well as the impact of different distortions g and capitalization standards.
The underlying distortion can be calibrated to market prices. Market calibration to cat bond
data and standard intermediated insurance data would reveal how much of the cost of capital
arises from frictional costs and how much from shape of risk. The work can also be extended
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Figure 2: A thin tailed line combined with a thick tailed line. See text for a key to the graphs.
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line but dramatic impact on thin.
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to dynamic portfolios and then applied to questions of optimal risk pooling under costly
capital.
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